Žinutės

labas vakaras,gal kam teko savo svetaines apkrovas testuot,planuojama per dienas 10-20k user,gal zinot iranki kuris padetu user uzejimus(register,puslapiavimas) svetaineje pratestuot?

- Agent identity verified via AgentIdentity.isValidAgent() on all task inputs
- Task signatures verified via MessageSigning before execution
- Self-loop prevention: from !== to on all inter-agent tasks
- Override signatures require physical approval file (.secure/override-approval.json)
- A2A Bearer token required for HTTP inter-agent calls
- PostgreSQL RLS policies enforce per-agent data isolation
- Security enforcement is CODE-based (IronClaw gateway, RLS, MessageSigning) — NOT agent-based
- ZOE is a sandboxed technical assistant (Linux only) — NOT a security agent. Security is code-enforced
only.

## Port & Process Security (MANDATORY)

Every service MUST claim a port before binding to it. Unknown processes on unregistered ports
are treated as security threats.

| Action | Tool |
|--------|------|
| Reserve a new port | node core/port-registry.js suggest "Name" "Description" |
| Check what's on a port | curl http://localhost:3000/api/ports/enriched |
| Investigate a SUSPECT entry | Check category: 'SUSPECT' in Port Registry UI — process PID is in
description |
| Kill unauthorized listener | taskkill /PID <pid> /F after confirming it's not legitimate |

Port Registry rules:
- Reservations are permanent logs — persist even when a service is idle/down
- PortProcessMonitor auto-registers PM2 services and alerts on squatters
- MPRO Hub Port Registry (localhost:3000) shows SUSPECT entries (red) for unregistered listeners
- Docker containers (category: docker) and external services (category: external) are exempt from squatter
checks
- "Unknown" label = null pm2Name + no description → INVESTIGATE before accepting

If Port Registry UI (localhost:3000) is down:
1. Check PM2: pm2 list — look for MPROHub
2. Restart: pm2 restart MPROHub
3. Check raw registry: node core/port-registry.js list
4. Emergency netstat: netstat -ano | findstr LISTENING (manual SUSPECT scan)

## Web Application Security (web / ecommerce surfaces)

These ADD to the checks above for any public/web/ecommerce surface (WooCommerce, WordPress, the
Node/Postgres storefronts and APIs). They do NOT replace the pre-commit credential scan or the
security-scanning-harness.md 16 FP rules - they extend them.

### LIKE / wildcard-injection escaping (HIGH - applies to our search boxes)

Parameterized queries stop SQL injection, but they do NOT neutralize the `LIKE` wildcards `%` and
`_` inside the parameter VALUE. An attacker who types % or _ (or \) into a search box makes
the pattern match far more than intended - a real scan / data-exposure / algorithmic-DoS vector (a
leading %...% on an unindexed column forces a full scan). So on ANY LIKE/ILIKE built from user
input, escape the pattern metacharacters BEFORE composing the pattern, even though the query is
parameterized. Technique: the standard escapeLikePattern - escape \ FIRST (so you do not
re-escape the escapes you add), then % and _.

Reference technique (generic, from the Exposed ORM escapeLikePattern pattern):
```
// escape order matters: backslash first, then the wildcards
escapeLikePattern(s) = s.replace("\\","\\\\").replace("%","\\%").replace("_","\\_")
```

- WooCommerce / WordPress (PHP) - the canonical idiom. Run esc_like() on the raw term, wrap
with your own wildcards, THEN pass through prepare(). BOTH are required: esc_like neutralizes
% _ \; prepare neutralizes SQL injection.
```php
// $search = raw user input from the search box
$like = '%' . $wpdb->esc_like( $search ) . '%';
$rows = $wpdb->get_results(
$wpdb->prepare( "SELECT ID FROM {$wpdb->posts} WHERE post_title LIKE %s", $like )
);
```
- Node / Postgres (pg) - parameter still carries wildcards. Escape \ % _ in the value before it
becomes the LIKE/ILIKE parameter (Postgres' default LIKE escape char is backslash).
```js
const esc = s => s.replace(/\\/g, '\\\\').replace(/%/g, '\\%').replace(/_/g, '\\_');
// WHERE name ILIKE $1 -- value is data (no SQL injection) but % _ are still live without esc()
const rows = await pool.query('SELECT id FROM products WHERE name ILIKE $1', [%${esc(term)}%]);
```
- If a use case must allow user-supplied wildcards deliberately, that is an explicit, documented
design choice - never the accidental default of an unescaped LIKE.

### Security-header checklist (web / ecommerce)

Set these on web responses (theme/mu-plugin, reverse proxy, or the Node/API layer). Tighten CSP
per surface; start from default-src 'self' and widen only what a page genuinely needs.

| Header | Value (baseline - tighten per surface) | Protects against |
|--------|----------------------------------------|------------------|
| Strict-Transport-Security | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload | SSL-strip / downgrade
(HTTPS only) |
| Content-Security-Policy | default-src 'self' (add script-src/style-src/img-src as needed) |
XSS / injection / data exfiltration |
| Set-Cookie (session/auth) | ; Secure; HttpOnly; SameSite=Lax (Strict for pure session cookies) |
session theft, CSRF, JS cookie theft |
| X-Content-Type-Options | nosniff | MIME-sniffing content confusion |
| X-Frame-Options OR CSP | DENY / SAMEORIGIN, or CSP frame-ancestors 'self' | clickjacking |
| Referrer-Policy | strict-origin-when-cross-origin (or no-referrer) | referrer/URL-param leakage |
| CORS (Access-Control-Allow-Origin) | allowlist explicit origins - never `*` in production,
especially with credentials | cross-origin data theft |

### File-upload validation (any user-supplied file)

Validate on the SERVER, never trust the client. All of these:
- Extension allowlist (deny by default) - accept only the explicit set the feature needs
(e.g. .jpg .jpeg .png .gif .pdf); reject everything else. Never a denylist.
- Size cap - enforce a max byte size (reject oversized uploads before processing).
- Content-type / magic-byte check - verify the real file type from its bytes; do NOT trust the
declared Content-Type header or the extension alone.
- Store outside the webroot - save uploads where they cannot be executed as code; serve via a
handler or a separate media origin, with a randomized/non-guessable stored filename.

### Escape-before-render trap (raw-HTML sinks)

Auto-escaping frameworks are safe UNTIL a raw-HTML escape hatch is used on untrusted input. Never
pass user input through a raw-HTML sink without escaping it FIRST:
- PHP/WP: escape (esc_html) before echo; never echo raw user HTML.
- Django templates: never {{ user_input|safe }} / mark_safe(user_input) - mark_safe(escape(x)), escape
THEN mark safe.
- React: avoid dangerouslySetInnerHTML on user input; Vue: avoid v-html; Angular: avoid
bypassSecurityTrustHtml.

These raw-HTML escape hatches are exactly the exception carved out by FP rule 14 in
security-scanning-harness.md - a finding in an auto-escaping framework is real ONLY when one of
these sinks touches untrusted input. Escape before render; never trust user HTML.

## When Security Issue Found

btw, jei kas Wordpress'ų turit, pažiūrėkit ar į 7.0.2 atsinaujino, nes https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60137 leidžia gauti shell'ą (ir, žinant paskutinius kernel exploit'us – root) nesudėtingai. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SKuJ60kD8wg

Gal kas radot kaip parsisiųsti artifacts html failus kuriuos claude.ai patalpina web'inėje svetainėje, galima persžiūrėt, bet nerandu kaip parsisiųst :)

a6 kuriuosi centralizuotą eshop valdymo sistemą, kad atentai gebėtų valdyti >40 eshop'ų su chatbotais, valdyti kainas; kad neblūdytų visas harnesas aplink statomas taisyklės (marketingui, kas galima, ko negalima).. Neprikalusomai nuo platformos (dabar woocommerce, reiks galima bus greitai migruoti, nes visa informacija sėdi ne wp ar kitoje duomenų bazėje, kaip šaltinis, o mano sistemoje iš kurios info keliauja jau į platformą). Mikro-procesų principu architektūrą darausi, kad po to kiek vienas turėtų po savo duomenų bazę atsakyti klientams į klausimus, bet kuria kalba :) Dar iš sau, tam susikurti, duoto laiko liko 5 mėnesiai be kelių dienų :)